Gide's quest for authenticity by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Smith, William Henry

SMITH, WILLIAM HENRY,  aide's Quest for Authenticity.  (1970) Directed 
by:  Dr.  J.P.  Couch. pp.  kl 
Throughout his literary career,  Andre Gide was concerned with 
the problem of counterfeit existence,  the blind acceptance of conven- 
tional values, versus an authentic existence based on an accurate 
understanding of one's desires and capacities.  Because these desires 
and capacities differ from one individual to the next, Gide could not 
present a universal formula for attaining authenticity.  Instead, he 
sought in his fiction to express the need for escape from the counter- 
feit,  and to  describe some of the pitfalls along the way to authenti- 
city. 
Because the quest for authenticity was a personal as well ac a 
literary concern for Gide, much criticism has dealt with his own efforts, 
as expressed in autobiography and journals,  and has treated his  fiction 
in this light.  Believing that the focus of criticism should be the 
literary work itself,  I have approached Gide's quest from the stand- 
point of the works alone.   I have examined the failures of Gide's heroes 
in order to  find a formula whereby 3uch failures could be avoided.  This 
formula must be expressed in general terms,  to allow for differences 
between individuals;  nevertheless, a certain pattern is common to all 
of Gide's failures. 
The Gide hero,  if he succeeds in escaping conventionality at all, 
fails because he becomes  trapped in a situation in which he has denied 
himself alternatives,  and he can no  longer advance.  This situation is 
the result of an incomplete knowledge of hijnself,  in particular a 
failure to understand that there are both terrestrial and celestial sides 
to human nature. Having chosen one side at the expense of the other, he 
lacks alternatives and restraint, pushes his way of life to an untenable 
extreme,  and figuratively destroys himself. 
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Introduction to the Method 
Songez a l'interet qu'aurait pour nous un semblable 
carnet tenu par Dickens,  ou Balzac;   si nous  avions 
le journal de 1'Education sentimentale ou des Freres 
Karamazof1    l'Histoire de l'oeuvre,   de sa gestation! 
Mais ce serait passionnant...plus interessant que 
l'oeuvre elle-meme.. . 
Edouard,  the novelist in Les Faux-monnayeurs,  seems to be speaking 
here for his creator in expressing a greater interest in the creative 
process  than in the product of creation.     In addition to a  journal of 
the creation of Les Faux-monnayeurs,  Gide kept and published his own 
private journal from 1889 to 19U9,  as well as three distinctly auto- 
biographical works  (Si le grain ne meurt,  Et nunc manet in te,   and 
Ainsi  soit-il),   and a defense of his own homosexuality (Corydon). 
Given his interest in the biographies of other artists,  the abundance 
of information he provided about his own life, and the fact that he 
achieved literary prominence when critics, armed with the newly avail- 
able Freudian psychology, were turning their attention to the psycho- 
logy of creation,  it is not surprising that Gide has  been the subject 
of extensive biographical criticism. 
The danger in such criticism is that however much it may tell  us 
about the poet and the creative act, it  tends to overlook the work 
itself, which should be the central part of the study of literature. 
l-Andre Gide, Les Faux-monnayeurs,   in Ceuvres Completes,  v.   XH 
(Paris,  NRF, 1937),  p.  273. 
-a- 
An understanding of Andre Gide's feelings for Madeleine Rondeaux may 
help us to understand his vision of Alissa in La Porte etroite, but it 
adds nothing to our knowledge of Alissa's internal conflict that we do 
not learn from the "Journal d'Alissa". Likewise, a knowledge of Gide's 
homosexuality makes the marital relations of Michel and Marceline in 
L'Immoraliste more understandable, and helps to explain Edouard's 
failure to marry Laura and his sentiments toward Olivier, but these 
are side issues and not the central themes of those works. The works, 
although laced with incidents drawn from Gide's life, stand by them- 
selves and have no need of assistance from autobiography. 
Rather than study Gide to understand his characters, I shall 
study the characters in order to understand Gide's vision of the path 
to authentic existence. That this was a central concern of Gide's 
life and work could be shown from an examination of either the auto- 
biography or the fictionj that it is true in the latter case will be 
seen in the course of this study. 
It has been occasionally suggested that men seek in literature 
the answers to the problems of their own lives.  If answers to the pro- 
blems of life exist in Gide's fiction, they exist only in a negative 
sense. That is, he provides wrong answers that are to be avoided. He 
says, for example, of La Porte ftroite:  "Qui done persuaderai-je que 
ce livre est jumeau de l'Immoraliste et que les deux sujets ont grandi 
concurremment dans mon esprit,  l'exces de l'un trouvant dans 1'excVs 
de l'autre une permission secrete et tous deux se maintenant en 
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equilibre."2    He indicates that neither work is to be taken as the 
true path,  that both attitudes must be taken into account in seeking 
to define one's raison d'etre. 
More to the point,  he writes  in the Journal des Faux-monnayeurs: 
"Ce qui manque a chacun de mes heros, que j'ai tailles dans ma chair 
meme,  c'est ce peu de bon sens qui me retient de pousser aussi loin 
qu'eux leurs folies."      Bernard,  in Les Faux-monnayeurs,  clarifies 
this attitude: 
Je me disais que rien n'est bon pour tous, mais 
seulement par  rapport a certains;  que rien n'est 
vrai pour tous,  mais seulement par rapport a qui 
le  croit tel;  qu'il n'est methode ni thSorie qui 
soit applicable indifferemment a chacun;  que si, 
pour agir,  il  nous faut choisir,  du moins nous 
avons libre choix;  que si nous n'avons pas libre 
choix, la chose est plus simple encore;  mais que 
ceci me devient vrai  (non d'une maniSre absolue 
sans  doute, mais par rapport a moi) qui me permet 
le meilleur emploi de mes forces,  la mise en oeuvre 
de mes vertus.1* 
Like Bernard,   all of Gide's characters speak for themselves,  not for 
the author.    I shall assume,  as a critical postulate,  that  all such 
statements are valid only for a particular attitude and within a 
particular work, unless  they are repeated often enough in a  suffi- 
ciently wide range of works and characters to indicate a more general 
validity. 
Andre Gide, Journal,  llie Cahier,  in Oeuvres Completes,  v. VII, 
p.   530. 
•^Oeuvres  Completes,  v.  XIII, p.  52. 
^Les Faux-monnayeurs, p.   285. 
T -u- 
n 
Authenticity 
Jocaste:    Pourquoi veux-tu le ssvoir? 
Oedipe:      J'ai grand be3oin. 
Jocaste:    N'auras-tu pas pitie de ton bonheur? 
Oedipe:      Pitie de rien.    Un bonheur fait d'erreur 
et d'ignorance,  je n'en veux pas.     Bon 
pour le peuplel    Pour moi,  je n'ai pas 
besoin d'etre heureux.    C'en est faitj 
Toute la nuee de cet enchantement se 
dechire.5 
Gide  shared this feeling with Oedipe;  although he believed to the end 
that  the chief goal of life is joy, had he been forced to choose 
between happiness and awareness, he too would have chosen awareness. 
In fact,  happiness and awareness were inseparable for Gide;   to be 
happy one must first discover and understand the true meaning of one's 
life,  the path that will permit "le meilleur emploi de  [ ses 3  forces." 
Strouvilhou,  the counterfeiter,  describes  the opposite of this 
awareness: 
Nous vivons sur les sentiments admis et que le 
lecteur s'imagine eprouver, parce qu'il croit 
tout ce qu'on imprime; l'auteur specule la-dessus 
comme sur des  conventions qu'il  croit les bases 
de  son art.    Ces sentiments sonnent faux comme 
des jetons, mais ils ont cours.    Et,  comme l'on 
sait que "la mauvaise monnaie chasse la bonne", 
celui qui offrirait au public de vraies pieces 
semblerait nous payer de mots. 
5Andre Gide', Oedipe,  in Theatre (Paris,  NRF,  19u2), p.   293. 
6Les Faux-monnayeurs, pp.  U66-U67. 
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In spite of Strouvilhou's editorial advice,  Qide the author sought to 
offer the true coins,  to act as a Socratic gadfly to cause his readers 
to reject the false coins of convention and discover the true worth of 
their own existence. 
But the discovery of one's authentic being is-not so easy as it 
might seem,  for what is genuine for one may be counterfeit for another. 
Menalque describes the situation in L'lmmoraliste; 
Des mille formes de la vie,  chacun ne peut 
connaLtre qu'une.  fiivier le bonheur d'autrui, 
c'est foliej on ne saurait pas  s'en servir. 
Le bonheur ne se veut pas tout  fait, raais sur 
mesure.  Je pars demain;   je sais:  jjai tache 
de tailler ce bonheur a ma taille. 
The important thing, he tells Michel, is to choose the form of happi- 
ness appropriate to one's own capacity.  It may well be that the appro- 
priate form will lie within accepted values,  but in order to find it 
one must first free oneself from the bonds of tradition in order to 
examine without prejudice the many possibilities available to one. 
Here lies the key to the failure of the Gide hero; he is either 
unable to free himself from tradition, or is able to escape only by 
replacing traditional values by their opposites. With his vision thus 
impaired he makes a wrong choice, pushes his folly to excess and des- 
troys himself.  Before examining the particular characters it will be 
useful to look in general terms at the mistakes that lead to wrong 
choices.  In doing this we rtiall seek to establish criteria for the 
choice of an authentic way of life. 
7Andre Qide,  L'lmmoraliste (Paris,  Mercure de France,  1902), 
p.  120. 
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Whila the history of French literature offers many examples of 
characters who flee tradition to find their own values, the works of 
three foreign writers of the nineteenth century will provide a good 
illustration of Gide's formula for success. Each of these foreign 
writers influenced Gide, and each offers a basic ingredient of that 
formula. 
Goethe offers the example of Faust, a man whose thirst for 
knowledge could not be satisfied by conventional means. Not only does 
Faust defy tradition by turning to Mephistopheles, but, unlike his 
predecessors, he will not settle for a mere trade. Instead, he exerts 
his individuality by wagering his soul against the possibility of his 
being satisfied with a static situation. So long as Faust remains un- 
satisfied, so long as he wishes to move on, he is safe from damnation, 
and on that basis the angels claim his soul when he dies. 
Gide expresses a similar dislike of stasis through two characters 
who are otherwise quite dissimilar. Alissa, the religious extremist, 
writes in her journal: 
Je me figure la joie celeste non comme une 
confusion en Dieu, mais comme un rapprochement 
infini. continu...et si je ne craignais de jouer 
sur un mot, je dirais que 1e ferais fi d'une joie qui 
ne serait pas progressive. 
At the other end of the scale, the amoralist Menalque uses like terms 
to describe his earthly pleasure: 
J'ai l'horreur du repos; la possession y 
encourage et dans la securite l'on s'endort; 
8Andre Gide, La Porte €troite (Paris, Mercure de France, 1959), 
p. 158. 
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j'aime assez vivre pour pretendre vivre 
eveille",  et maintiens done,  au sein de mes 
richesses memes,  ce sentiment d'etat prlcaire 
par quoi j'exaspere, ou du moins j'exalte 
ma vie." 
This refusal of stasis and emphasis on progression,  coming from 
such different personalities,  indicates that Gide assigned considerable 
importance to this concept.    We may hypothesize that progression is 
one of the prerequisites of a successful way of life.    This hypothesis 
will be tested during the examination of Gide's heroes. 
In addition to the break with tradition and the hatred of 
repose,  Goethe's Faust offers a  third concept that is  important in the 
works of Gide;  the lack of unity in human nature: 
Zwei Seelen wohnen,  ach,  in meiner Brust, 
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen: 
Die sine halt sich in derber Liebeslust 
Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organenj 
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust 
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.10 
These two sides of man's personality,  the celestial and the terrestrial, 
exist in all men, particularly in Gide's heroes.    If one side is chosen 
at the expense of the other,  disaster will follow. 
The concept of polarized human nature is developed more fully by 
the second of Gide's foreign influences.    In the words of Georges 
LeMaitre, 
[Dostoievsky]    did not sacrifice to theoretical 
unity and simplicity the rich and sometimes dis- 
concerting complexity of the human soul.    In him 
L'Immoraliste,  p.  110. 
iOjohann Wolfgang von Goethe,  Faust (Munchen, Wilhelm Goldmann 
Verlag,  196l),  p.  UU. 
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Gide found an example  of conscience in distress, 
laden with a feeling of sin—of unavoidable 
sin—and yet at the same time a  truly noble 
conscience longing for salvation.11 
This internal conflict fills many pages of Gide's journals,  and plays 
an important role in his fiction as well. 
Dostoievsky,  even more than Goethe,  depicted characters who 
broke with tradition to find for themselves  the true meanings of their 
lives.    This break is often expressed through a gratuitous act,  an act 
without other motivation than the desire to commit it.    The gratuitous 
act becomes an important motif in Gide's fiction as he seeks to show 
that one is most sincere when he acts without external cause.    The most 
famous of these acts is Lafcadio's murder of Amedee Fleurissoire,  in 
Les Caves du Vatican.    If this  act is a demonstration of Lafcadio's 
true nature, it is certainly of the terrestrial,  or selfish side. 
There is,  however,  earlier in the sotie,  another gratuitous act,  the 
saving of two children from a burning building, which demonstrates the 
celestial,   or altruistic,  side. 
Lafcadio's murder, like that of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punish- 
ment,  is done as a proof of self-will.    This act is carried to the 
extreme in The Possessed, where Kirilov kills himself in order to 
prove that God does  not exist,   and that all  that remains  is his own 
self-will.     In this instance self-will is in conflict with will-to-live, 
in conflict,  in fact, with reason.    For Gide,  according to LeMaitre, 
'•absolute liberty is possible  only when all rational motives are 
11Georges LeMaitre, Four  French Novelists  (Oxford University 
Press,  1938),  p. 133. 
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eliminated; it is a manifestation of the original and genuine perso- 
nality."12 However, Gide's treatment of his "free" characters shows 
that he realizes that such unlimited and unreasoning freedom is 
meaningless. Michel, Alissa, Oedipe, and even Protos are trapped by 
their own freedom. 
The need for restraint is voiced by the third of Gide's foreign 
influences, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche is perhaps better known 
as the prophet of liberty and overflowing vitality—qualities expressed 
in the concept of the Ubermensch--but he was nevertheless careful to 
make this observation in Beyond Good and Evil: 
The singular fact remains, however, that everything 
of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, 
and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, 
whether it be in thought itself, or in administra- 
tion, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as 
in conduct, has only developed by means of the 
tyranny of such arbitrary laws; and in all serious- 
ness, It is not at all improbable that precisely 
this is 'nature' and 'natural', and not laisser- 
allerl13 
Nietzsche hastens to add that through these arbitrary laws much has 
been stifled; nevertheless, without some such restraint freedom becomes 
aimless and meaningless. 
Gide discovered Nietzsche while writing L'Immoraliste, and dis- 
covered in Nietzsche the expression of much of his own thought. 
Indeed, it would be difficult to decide whether the following passage 
had been expressed by Nietzsche, Menalque, Bernard Profitendieu, or 
l2Le Mattre, p. 17U. 
^Friedrich Nietzsche,  Beyond Good and Evil,  in The Philosophy 
of Nietzsche  (New York,  195U),  PP- U76-U77T 
-10- 
I 
even Julius de Baraglioul: 
The great majority of people, whatever they may 
think and say about their 'egoism', do nothing 
for their ego all their life long, but only for 
a phantom of this ego which has been formed in 
regard to them by their friends and communicated 
to them.11* 
This statement, although by Nietzsche, underlies much of Gide's work, 
Les Faux-monnayeurs in particular. Similarly, Michel's decision to 
become an immoralist seems to be in response to Nietzsche's suggesting 
that: "An evaluation of our own, which is the appreciation of a thing 
in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure it causes us and no one 
else, is something very rare indeed."15 
There was, without question, much more that Gide learned from 
these foreign writers. It is not, however, the subject of this study 
to trace the sources of Gide's thought, but to examine the expression 
of that thought through his fiction. To that purpose the examples 
given here will serve to illustrate the basic ingredients of Gide's 
recipe for authentic existence, ingredients which, if omitted, bring 
about the downfall of the Gide hero. 
Briefly, the recipe of authenticity is as follows: One must 
throw off the yoke of convention in order to examine for oneself the 
path one is to take, without the incumbrance of prejudices. This path 
must allow a continuous progression, and must take into account both 
the celestial and the terrestrial sides of human nature. Although it 
^Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day, in Reality, Man and 
—'■ orTc,T965), P.  57. Existence,  ed. H. J.  Blackham"TNewTor 
x^The Dawn of Day_,  p.  57. 
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may find its best expression in the unreasoned,  unmotivated acte 
gratuit, without some form of restraint it will soon become meaning- 
less  and perhaps even fatal. 
Before turning to examine the particular characters,  one word 
of warning,  in regard to Gide's universe,  is in order.    By "universe" 
I mean all those forces,  either "natural" or "supernatural", which are 
beyond  the control of  the central characters and which are of impor- 
tance to the work.    These include acts of God or of the gods,  fate, 
and the irony with which Gide treats some of his characters.    Gide 
does  not present a consistent universe;  the degree of external 
influence differs from work to work.    At times,  when dealing with 
classical or Biblical  subjects,  Gide himself was limited by a 
determined system.    In other works,  especially the soties,  his 
attitude toward the work forced him to interfere with the action. 
Freedom has one meaning in a universe in which man has free will,  and 
quite another in a universe in which all is determined by external 
powers.    Therefore,   the nature of each particular work must be 
considered before determining the success or failure of the characters 
involved. 
Armed with a hypothetical recipe for authenticity and warned 
against an inconsistent universe, we may now turn to an examination of 
those characters who succeed in finding an authentic mode of existence. 
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III 
The Successful 
As we have seen,  Gide did not try to present a formula through 
which one could attain authentic existence.     Rather, he  sought in his 
fiction to demonstrate  the wrong answers,  the paths to be avoided. 
Consequently,  one does  not expect  to find a Gide hero who makes a 
success of his life.    Nevertheless,  there are several means by which 
Gide suggests  the way to success. 
The first of such devices might be called the  theoretical  success. 
It is  theoretical in the sense that this way of life is  not put to the 
test in the course of the book.    Theoretical  success is  seen in 
Me'nalque, who appears in three of Gide's works, each time acting as 
a sort of deus ex machina,  or as  a catalyst who initiates a revolt 
from convention,  then disappears.    We learn nothing of MSnalque 
except what he tells us,  and this  consists more of general maxims  than 
of specific examples.    We thus cannot know exactly how he puts his 
theory into practice. 
The second device might be called the potential success,  the 
character    who, when we leave hun,   seems to have found the path to 
success but has not as yet tested his way of life.    Lafcadio,  of 
Les Caves du Vatican,  might be included in this group,   but he belongs 
more appropriately to  a  special  class.    A better example of the 
potential  success is found in Le Prom^thee mal enchalne where,  at  the 
-13- 
end,  Promethee seems on the path  to authenticity. 
The final device involves irony and the ambiguous success of 
Thesee and Oedipe.     In each of  these works  the question of  success 
or failure is  entirely a matter of interpretation;   the only definite 
conclusion is  that if either one is indeed a success,  the  other must 
be a failure.    This ambiguity constitutes a special case that will be 
examined in a  separate  section. 
A.    Theoretical Success—Menalque 
Menalque first appears  in Les Nourritures  terrestres, where his 
function is  to inspire  the narrator to lead a life of hedonism and to 
rebel against tradition.    He advocates a life of freedom and irrespon- 
sibility that may be summed up in two phrases: 
La  necessite de 1'option me fut toujours  intolerable; 
choisir m'apparaissait npn tant elire,  que repousser 
ce que je n'elisais pas. 9 
J'ai compris nontenant que toutes les gouttes de 
cette grande  source divine s"equivalent,^que la 
moindre  suffit a  notre ivresse et nous  revele la 
plenitude et la totalite de Dieu. 
He refuses  anything that can bind him to a fixed mode of existence. 
He can  take equal pleasure from feasting or fasting,  from sleeping 
with a beautiful courtisane or with the ugliest cabin-boy.    He hates 
possessions;  he amassed great wealth only to dispose of it.    He advises 
!9Andre Gide,  Les Nourritures terrestres  (Paris,  Gallimard, 
1917),  p.  65. 
20Les Nourritures terrestres,  p.  66. 
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pure hedonism,finding joy in all  of creation. 
Gide, with his usual irony,  inserts beneath this overlay of sen- 
sual pleasure a suggestion of aimlessr.ess and boredom that challenges 
Menalque's success.    Menalque seems in fact to be seeking disciples in 
order to prove  to himself that he is happy.    His life lacks  the  res- 
traint that Nietzsche found necessary and it lacks an upward movement, 
passing instead from one thing to another of equal value.    This Menalque 
is at best an ambiguous  success. 
Menalque makes a  second,  brief appearance in Le Promethee mal 
enchaine,    where he serves tha same function,  and plays  that role again 
in L'lmmorallste,  providing a direction for Michel's break with conven- 
tion.     This time we are given but a brief outline of his biography. 
His life is  similar to that of the first Menalque,  but it  is sufficient- 
ly different to change him from ambiguous  to theoretical success.    This 
Menalque, like the first one,  advises a break with convention,   the 
refusal  of possessions,  and a state of openness  to experience.    This 
time we learn even less of how he puts his theory into practice,  but 
from what we do learn there is no reason to doubt his success. 
The first Menalque was in the beginning nomadic,  then sedentary, 
then again nomadic,  the third is  always on the move.    The first spent 
years  in gathering a fortune which he then got rid of;  the third keeps 
objects only so long as he gets pleasure from them,  then abandons 
them,  but,  as in the case of the fabrics in his room, he allows 
society to benefit from them.    His hedonism If not dissociate from 
an interest in humanity. 
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The third Menalqua usually abstains from tobacco and alcohol in 
order to maintain his lucidity,  but during the evening with Michel he 
lights  a cigarette and drinks Persian wine.    He abstains  so long as 
it serves his purpose,  but does not allow abstention to become an 
inviolable rule.    He thus remains open to both sides of an experience. 
The first Me'nalque saw equal value in every choice,  and made no 
effort to select those pleasures best, suited to himself.    He was thus 
faced with a  confused array of possibilities among which he wandered 
aimlessly.    The Menalque of L'Immoraliste welcomes options because 
they allow him to choose the best one:   "L1 important,  c'est de savoir 
ce que l'on veut."21    He, like Nietzsche, accuses men of choosing 
according to what they think they are expected to choose,  with nc 
real knowledge of  themselves. 
We have  already seen that there is  a touch of altruism mixed with 
the hedonism of this Menalque.    A  better example of this  is seen in the 
attitude of  the press toward him.     It is through the newspapers, 
eager for the boost that a scandal gives to circulation,   that Michel 
learns of Me'nalque's trial,  but the same press informs him that 
MeWque's explorations are for the good of the nation,  and of humanity. 
By having goals outside himself the third Me'nalque is able  to make a 
vertical progression in his constantly renewed choice and not  simply 
exchange one pleasure for another of equal value. 
The simultaneous operation of hedonistic and altruistic motives 
allows Me'nalque to take into account both the terrestrial and the 
21L'Immoraliste,  p.  120. 
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celestial  sides of his nature.    It keep3 him constantly striving and 
apparently guarantees his  salvation,  as it did for Faust. 
B.  Potential Success--Prome'thee 
The success of Promethee is termed potential   because we  cannot 
learn what he will do with it.    His success comes only at the end of 
the sotie,  and it remains untested.    The situation is rendered more 
complex by the  fact that Le Promethee mal enchaine  is a  sotie,  and, 
while it has a  serious purpose, its correspondence to everyday reality 
is limited.     Its serious purpose,  and the success of Promethee,  are 
symbolic,  and the relationship between symbol and practical  existence 
is a matter of interpretation. 
Promethee,  by virtue of his divinity,  accomplishes what the nar- 
rator of Paludes  failed to do:    he demonstrates to men the meaningless- 
nes3 of non-awareness.     "Ils etaient tres peu eclaires;  j'inventai 
pour eux quelques feux,  et des lors ?ommenca mon aigle." Not satis- 
fied with giving men a consciousness of their being, he wished to give 
them a raisnn d'etre. His metaphor of fire shifts from light to heat, 
and he finds  the raison d'gtre in that which consumes man. 
All of this is in retrospect.    At the beginning of the sotie he 
has decided to  ignore his eagle,  has left the Caucasus and come to 
22Andre Gide,  Le Promethee mal enchaine,  in Oeuvres  Completes, 
v.  Ill,  p. 132. 
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Paris.    Through the first part of the book he continues to feed the 
bird,  but he does  not benefit from it,  and the eagle remains weak and 
ugly.    In the second part he allows himself to be consumed by the 
eagle, which becomes healthy and beautiful while he declines.    He has 
not yet learned to profit from his raison d'etre,  as is shown when the 
eagle    refuses  to perform at his lecture.    In the final part of the 
sotie he eats the bird,  symbolically incorporating it into himself,  r,o 
that together they become healthy and beautiful.    Promethee ha3 
finally learned to understand his own life and measured his happiness 
according to his own capacity, making of himself what he can and no 
longer depending on external forces. 
The story of Promethee is contrasted to the story-within-the- 
story,  the history of Tityre.    Tityre,  borrowed from the novel-within- 
the-novel of Paludes,  is perfectly happy doing nothing.    Menalque comes 
by and plants  the seed of an idea.    The  result of this idea  is an 
entire civilization with Tityre happily at its head.    At the bidding 
of Angelique,  Tityre leaves his community to take care of itself and 
ventures to Paris where he loses AngeUque to Noelibe'e.    Tityre is 
left at the end as he was at the beginning.    He,  unlike Prome'thSe, 
depended on externals for his happiness,  and was unable to control 
his own fate. 
While Prome"thee acts as a symbolic  example,  in contrast  to the 
more realistic  but more didactic Menalque, we can discern in the former 
the same keys  to success  that we found  in the latter.     Both  choose 
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their patterns of life on the basis of a  thorough knowledge of the 
self,   a  self  that includes goals beyond personal pleasure.    They 
manage  thus  to escape both the counterfeit of slavish imitation and 
the equal danger of blind solipsism.    Promethee himself offers as 
one interpretation of his eagle the belief in progress,  the same 
belief  that allowed Menalque to advance by his ever-renewed choice. 
Neither  of these is a truly "human"  character in Gide's works. 
Although Menalque is physically present,  he serves as the representa- 
tion of an idea rather than as an actor.    Similarly,  Promethee never 
quite descends to the level of the mortals.    Both Menalque and 
Promethee serve as  contrasts  to the human failures  that Gide depicts, 
but neither presents a  tested and guaranteed path to success; we do 
not know how they go about practicing their theories of authenticity. 
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IV 
The Failures 
A la  seule exception de mes Nourritures,  tous mes 
livres sonb des  livres ironiques;  ce sont des livres 
de critique.    La Porte %troite"est la critique d'une 
certaine tendance mystique;  Isabelle la critique 
d'une certaine forme de 1'imagination romantique; 
la Symphonie pastorale,  d'une forme de mensonge a 
soi-m§me;  l'Immoraliste,  d'une forme de 1'indivi- 
dual! sme.      " 
Gide had  to compose novels in order to escape from 
the pTETall of solipsism,   to which not only his own 
physical temperament and his education but the 
example of many self-centered symbolists in the 
Paris  cenacjes exposed him.^ 
Gide avoided solipsism by examining in a work of art a particular 
attitude and a particular  solution to the ambiguity of life and then, 
in the next work,   turning  to examine a completely different attitude. 
By means of this  alternation he maintained an artistic distance 
betweeen himself and his work.    Through this alternation he was 
constantly able  to renew his own choice instead of adopting one 
attitude and monotonously repeating the same  theme.    He thus 
avoided the rigidity that  brings about the downfall of most of Gide's 
characters:    having freed themselves from the bonds of conventionality 
they rush blindly into prisons of their own making. 
22Andr^Gide,  "Feuillets"  in Ceuvres Completes,  v.  XIII,  p.  U39. 
23Henri Peyre,  French Novelists of Today (Oxford University 
Press, 1967), p.  8£. 
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Some of Gide's characters do not even get this far.    The narrator 
of Paludes does not even succeed in changing his  subject from one 
novel  to the next.    Like Promethee, he wishes to give people an 
awareness of their own existence,  and he  seeks to accomplish this 
through literature.    He has little success,  if we may Judge from his 
friends, who do not bother even to read his books.    Undaunted, he 
continues to try to show others  the inanity of their lives: 
L'emotion que me donna ma vie,  c'est celle-la que 
je veux dire:    ennui,  vanite,  monotonie--moi, 
cela m'est egal parce que j'ecris Paludes--mais 
celle de Tityre n'est rien;  nos vies,  je vous assure, 
Angele,  sont encore bien plus ternes et mediocres.  • 
The narrator tries to escape this monotony by planning a voyage 
to Africa, which he is unable to carry out,  and one with Angele, 
which does not get past the suburbs.    Like Tityre,  he is unable  to act 
except in response to external  stimuli.    His only recourse is litera- 
ture,  and even there he cannot avoid the monotony of Paludes--Polders. 
The writer of the inner Paludes directs his attack against the 
emptiness of conventional life;   the writer of the inner Les Faux- 
monnayeurs,  Edouard,  is concerned with the falseness of that life.    In 
spite of the title,   the counterfeiting of money is  but a minor theme 
of this novel; the major concern is the counterfeit existence of which 
Menalque spoke.    The true counterfeiters are those who define their 
lives according to what they think others expect of them.    These 
include the magistrates Profitendieu and Molinier, whose concern for 
2\ndre Gide,  Paludes,  in Oeuvres Completes,  v.  I,  p.   377. 
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law is  second to  their concern for their own images}   their roles 
render them blind to the situations of their own families.    Likewise, 
Pastor Prosper Vedel believes in God because,  if for no other reason, 
he can no longer afford not  to,  and the first consideration of the 
society novelist,  Robert de Passavant, is always for what his role 
demands  of him.     Every adult character of the novel  is a counterfeiter, 
playing either a  role of his  own choosing or one forced upon him. 
Perhaps the only non-counterfeiter is Strouvilhou,   the maker of false 
coins,  and even he plays roles in life--roles  that he chooses conscious- 
ly in order to profit from  the counterfeit lives of others. 
Paludes, written in 1895, precedes  those of Gide's works in 
which he explores a  tentative solution to the problem of meaningful 
existence;  by the time he wrote Les Faux-monnayeurs,   in 1926,  Gide had 
finished with all but two  of those works.    These works  thus form,  in 
a  sense,  the frame which surrounds Gide's quest for authenticity.    In 
neither of these does he offer an answer to that quest;  rather,   he 
expresses in them the need for such a quest.    Edch presents a writer 
who thinks he can escape monotony and falseness by writing about that 
need,  and each novelist is  shown to be a failure.    Paludes-  narrator 
cannot get past the suburbs,  and Edouard is unable to use "real" 
counterfeit money in a novel which is  to explore "la  rivalite du 
monde reel  et de la  repre'sentation que nous en faisons.    La maniere 
dont le monde des  apparences .<impose a nous et dont nous Unions 
d-imposer au monde exte'rieur notre interpretation particulieW2' 
2^Les Faux-monnayeurs,  p.  297. 
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Unable to escape a situation that he condemns,   the best Edouard can 
do is   to remain on the sidelines,  an observer who does not involve 
himself.     By occupying himself with writing, he does not have time to 
realize that he too is at fault. 
The characters discussed so far have failed to achieve authentic, 
meaningful existence through an inability to act.    Although perhaps 
aware  of the need for escape,  they cannot get past the confines of 
convention.    More typical is the Gide hero who takes a first step 
toward self-determined existence and,   through miscalculation,  puts 
himself in a  situation even worse  than that from which he tried to 
escape. 
A.    Failure Through Fear 
The great advantage of conventionality is security;  one's life 
is defined from without,  and one need not fear making a wrong choice. 
It is  fear of being alone and responsible for one's  acts  that holds 
one within the    confines of convention.    Ke'nalque sums it up in this 
way: 
On a peur de se trouver seul:    et l'on ne se trouve 
nas du tout.    Cette agoraphobia morale m'est odieuse; 
c'est la pire des la'chetel    Pourtant c'est toujours 
seul qu'on invente.    Mais qui cherche ici  d'inventer? 
Ce que l'on sent en spi de different,  c-est precxse- 
ment ce que l'on possede de rare,   ce qui fait a 
chacun sa valeur;  et c'est la ce que l'on tache de 
supprimer.    On imite.     Et 1-on pretend aimer la vie.26 
26L'Immoraliste, p.  H5. 
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It is fear that prevents the freedom of a third of Gide's 
novelist-heroes, Julius de Baraglioul of Les Caves du Vatican. Afraid 
oo seek sincerity in life, he seeks it in literature: "Les joies que 
je goute en ecrivant sont superieures a celles que je pourrais trouver 
a vivre."^? He is, however, unable to free himself even in literature, 
and his novels are very conventional and very mediocre. 
Julius' opportunity for escape comes from without,; he learns of 
the false Pope just at the time when he h8s despaired of winning 
election to the Academy. Without this symbol of absolutes he suddenly 
feels hijtiself freed of all his former restraints. He re-evaluates 
his life and sets out to write a different type of novel, one that may 
be truly valid, about an unmotivated crime. But, like Edouard, he is 
unable to face reality.  Lafcadio's gratuitous murder of Amedee 
frightens him, and he repudiates his new-found freedom and flies to 
the promise of a chair in the Academy.  "Deje s'eloignait de lui le 
souvenir de sa plus recente embardee, et toute autre pensee qu'ortho- 
doxe, et tout autre projet que decent. "cv 
Julius had no difficulty in returning to the fold because his 
freedom never got past the planning stage. When the break is completed, 
as in SaUl, return may be impossible. 
Saul is not, strictly speaking, a study of the quest for freedom; 
it begins, in fact, with the failure of that quest. The situation 
27L'Immoraliste, p. 115. 
28Les Caves du Vatican, p. 238. 
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is further complicated by the fact that, while Gide was free to apply 
his own interpretation to the legend, he  could not do violence to the 
overall pattern as  set forth in the  Bible.    The liberties  that Gide 
does take only serve to cloud the issue,  as far  as the quest for 
freedom is  concerned.    Over  the foundation of a man doomed to failure 
Gide lays a superstructure of homosexual flirtation.     Because Safll's 
future is determined by God,   this flirtation is  only an additional 
torment,  not the cause of his  failure. 
Saul's  troubles began when God  stopped speaking to him: 
II y eut un temps ou Dieu me repondait:  mais alors 
il est vrai que je l'interrogeais  tres peu.     Cheque 
matin,  le pretre me disait ce que je devais faire; 
c'etait tout l'avenir,  et je le connaissais. 
L'evenir,  c'est moi qui le    faisais.--Les Philistlns 
son*, venus;  je me suis inquiete;   j'ai  voulu 
interroger moi-memej  et,   des    lors, Dieu s'est tu. 
Comment voulait-il jjonc que j'agisse?    pour bien 
agir,  il  faut connaitre l'avenir.29 
Satll requires external support in order to act,   but that support comes 
from the High Priest,  not from God.    Frightened  by the Philistines,  he 
begins to doubt his ability to fulfill  the prophecies,  and God decides 
to replace him;  the entire drama depicts the terror of the doomed man. 
Having separated himself from the mass to become king,  he cannot 
abdicate his crown to return to the security of  commonality. 
The failures  of Baraglioul and Saul are due to weakness  and fear 
rather than to wrong choices.    In the ironic or critical works Gide 
turns to those who succeed in escaping mediocrity and doom themselves 
by their own miscalculations. 
29Andre Gide,  Saul,  in Oeuvres  Completes,   v.  II,  p.   218. 
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B.  Failure Through Negativity 
The miscalculation that leads to failure comes, most often, from 
a lack of understanding of oneself. This type of character fails to 
take into account the two sides of his nature, and his choice precludes 
any alternation between hedonism and altruism. Without these mutual 
restraints his life becomes negative, defined by what he refused 
rather than by what he accepts. It becomes an inversion of conven- 
tionality, just as static and inflexible as the way of life that 
was abandoned. 
Michel, the immoralist, becomes aware of his own life through a 
brush with death in tuberculosis. This initial spark is enough to 
make him aware that he is different from others, who have not known 
death, and he sets out to widen that separation. He compares himself 
to a palimpsest, and seeks to efface the recent text in order to 
discover his true self. This is the beginning of the new trap, to 
be constructed in the process of escaping the old one. Michel 
proposes to discard all acquired values, without first subjecting them 
to the test of his pleasure. He thus does not know whether or not 
certain of them might be proper to his own well-being. His quest for 
authenticity becomes totally negative, a rebellion simply for the 
sake of rebellion. Unlike Menalque, he cannot alternate or seek the 
best of each world. He denies himself all restraint in the system he 
has chosen, and his freedom soon becomes boredom. 
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Michel does not learn to measure happiness  according to his own 
capacity,  but he does acquire from Menalque a hatred of repose.     He 
is thus unable to  be satisfied in his  revolt}  any violation of conven- 
tional morality soon becomes  boring,  and another pleasure must be 
found to take its place.    When he can no longer find new pleasures he 
is trapped by his  need for change. 
His  fear of possession becomes  another liability in his system. 
He forgets that Marceline is  a distinct person,   capable of providing 
the restraint he needs,  and begins to treat her as an object,  a pos- 
session.    Afraid of being possessed by his possession,  he discards her, 
and is  left with no defense  against solipsism. 
Michel is even further handicapped by his  awareness of his 
revolt.    When Marceline accuses him of seeing only what he wants to 
see in others, he  admits that the worst instincts seem to him the most 
sincere.    Like Kirilov,  he seeks proof of his freedom in gratuitous 
acts,   but he feels   that only an    immoral act can be truly gratuitous 
and sincere.     Because he feels them to be necessary,   these acts are 
something less than disinterested.    Further,  his wrestling with farm- 
ers,  his poaching  on his own  estate,   even his tacit sanction of 
Moktir's theft of  the scissors,  all are tinged with homosexuality. 
These  "gratuitous"  acts are partly results of his passion and partly 
dictated by the role he has chosen,  and do not prove his self-will. 
The final irony,  and the beginning of the end of his happiness, 
is his learning that his recovery from tuberculosis might have  been 
due  to something more than his act of will.    When he boasts to Karce- 
-27- 
line that he cured himself alone, she answers that she had often 
prayed for him. With this doubting of his strength begins the process 
of disillusion that dominates the final part of the recit. His 
complaint about Switzerland reflects his own problems:  "Sans crimes, 
sans histoire, sans litterature, sans arts, c'est un robuste rosier, 
sans epines ni fleurs."3° gv the time he reaches Naples he is becoming 
aware of the meaninglessness of his life:  "Je marchais au hasard, 
sans but, sans desir , sans contrainte."-3 
After boredom, the last step in the decline is torment, both 
physical and spiritual. His homosexual pleasures are now disappoint- 
ing; he sleeps under the stars with a group of Arabs and returns 
covered with lice. He no longer even recognizes the children whose 
beauty once gave him great pleasure, and when they find him he can 
only see ugliness. He prays for new beauties, but there are none. 
He now feels the full force of his own meaninglessness. 
Donnez-moi des raisons d'etre. ^ Moi,_ je ne sais 
plus en trouver. Je me suis delivre, c'est 
possible; mais qu'importe? je souffre de cette 
liberte sans emploi. £.. .J 
J'avais, quand vous m'avez connu d'abord, 
une grande fixite de pensee, et je sais que 
c'est la ce qui fait les vrais hommes; je ne 
l'ai plus.'2 
Protos plays for Lafcadio much the same role that Menalque 
played for Michel, but his revolt against convention is like Michel's. 
30L'Immoraliste, p. 157. 
^L'lmmoraliste, p. 163. 
32L'Immoraliste, p. 179. 
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Unlike Menalque,   Protos exerts his  influence throughout the sotie,  and 
takes part in the action as well as offering advice.     His liberty- 
exists only in negative acts,  and he exceeds Michel in that he violates 
laws as well as  social conventions.    Protos  is more adept at playing 
the game,  using the counterfeits of others for his own amusement or 
profit.    The constant pressure of the police keeps him always alert to 
the joys of life,  but his crimes  carry him too far and he is eventually 
trapped by a  crime which,  ironically,  he did not have  the pleasure of 
committing.    Lacking both restraint and a positive goal, he is  caught 
in a situation of his own making. 
As Qide noted,  La Porte etroite forms a sort of counterweight to 
L'Immoraliste.    Michel is ruined by an excess of freedom, and Alissa 
by an excess of restraint.    She herself remarks:    "Oui, n'est-ce pas, 
ce qu'il faut chercher c'est une exaltation et non point une emanci- 
pation de la pensee.     Celle-ci ne va pas  sans un orgueil abominable. 
Mettre son ambition non a se revolter,  mais a  servir..."33    In spite 
of what she says, Alissa chooses  to rebel  against convention.    While 
Michel  rebels against the restraint of conventional morality,   sh- 
rebels against the laxity with which it is practiced.    In refusing 
what she considers  to be vice she is trapped as much as he is  in 
refusing  traditional virtue. 
La Porte  etroite also involves a  relationship of master and 
disciple.    Je'rSme,  the disciple  as well as  the narrator,  seems  to be 
the central figure through most of the rfcit.    It is only in the 
33La Porte etroite, p.  9h. 
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"Journal  d'Alissa," which occupies  the final part of the work,  that 
Alissa moves definitely to the foreground.    This situation is 
possible because Alissa and Jerome are essentially one.    His piety 
does  not carry him to the same  extremes,  but the difference between 
them is one of quantity,  not of quality.     Alissa notes thin  fact in 
her journal:     "Parfois,  en l'ecoutant parler je crois me regarder 
penser.    II m'explique et me decouvre a moi-meme.    Existerais-je sans 
lui?    Je ne  suis qu'avec lut.;."** 
Jerome does not feel that it is impossible for their spiritual 
love  to co-exist with physical love.    He  accepts the restraints she 
imposes in order  to merit her love,  in order not to win sainthood. 
Thus, when she advises him that man is born for saintliness,   not, for 
happiness,  his sign of agreement is a physical embrace.    He recognizes 
both sides of his personality and does  not suffer the anguish of her 
failure. 
Alissa can envision eternal happiness only through the refusal 
of all earthly pleasure. Her anguish comes from the failure of her 
sacrifice, as well as from the conflict between corporeal desire and 
aspiration to sainthood. The first suggestion of this failure comes 
when she attempts to deny her love for JeVome in order to leave him 
to her sister, and finds her sacrifice both refused and unnecessary 
for her sister's happiness. She thereby discovers a second defeat, 
for she learns that her sacrifice was in fact founded on pride. 
3^La Porte  etroite,  p.  157. 
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Her anguish increases as her journal continues. Not only does 
she begin to recognize the strength of the desires she has repressed, 
but she also begins to fear that her self denial has been for nothing. 
She realizes the irony of her situation, that she has sought spiritual 
perfection for Jerome's sake, and that that perfection can only be 
attained without him. What meaning has her quest when the means pre- 
clude the end? She needs Jerome in order to love God, but she needs 
him only in a negative way, so that she can sacrifice carnal desire to 
celestial aspiration. He has become for her an object, a possession 
that seeks to possess, and yet one side of her personality urgently 
wants to be possessed. 
The last entry in her journal expresses the despair of her futi- 
lity as she faces the final irony. Near the point of death, she writes: 
Un frisson de la chair et de Tame; c'etait comme 
l'eclaircissement brusque et desenchante de ma vie. 
II me semblait que je voyais pour la premiere fois 
les murs atrocement nus de ma chambre. [...4 
Seigneur] puisse-je atteindre jusqu'au bout sans 
blaspheme. [...]       x 
Je voudrais mourir a present, vite, avant 
d'avoir compris de nouveau que je suis seule.-" 
She has chosen to base her life on refusing the terrestrial side of 
her nature, instead of accepting it.  She has denied herself any 
alternation between these two aspects of her character and, parado- 
xically, failed to limit her restraint, JeVome's physical love could 
have acted as a check to her piety and allowed her the possibility of 
renewing her choice of direction in life instead of wasting away in a 
35La Porte etroite, p. 173. 
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static situation.  Ironically,  it is in this seemingly moral work that 
Gide  advocates  sexual love and suggests God's absence,  while the 
seemingly immoral L'Immoraliste suggests  a more general love and hints 
of God's presence. 
The portrayals of Baraglioul,  Saul,  Proton Michel, and Alissa 
represent Gide's major attempts  to  analyse and criticize the  quest for 
authenticity.   This question is also raised with regard to numerous 
minor characters, and even for major characters in works whose primary 
aim is not the examination of that quest.   The Prodigal Son (Le Retour 
de 1'enfant pro digue)  rebels  against conformity, but that rebellion 
serves primarily to initiate a theological discussion.  This is also 
the case in La Symphonie pastorale, where the pastor exhibits the same 
blindness to himself that we saw in Alissa.  The study of the false 
prophet,  El Hadj, may help elucidate the situation of Saul's High 
Priest and that of Pastor Prosper Vedel, who continue to support a 
system because they cannot afford not to,  but like Les Faux-monnayeurB 
it is a study of the counterfeit rather than the quest for the genuine. 
In addition to the ironic cases there remain the possible suc- 
cesses,  those who are never committed either to tradition or to revolt, 
who  in the end are faced with the choice of one or the other,  and for 
whom one can only guess what that choice will be. 
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Possible Success 
Among the list of possible successes one must include the entire 
younger generation of Les Faux-monnayeurs. They have not yet entered 
into the conventional world of adults and ere still testing their 
roles. Only after examining the possibilities available to them will 
they be able to decide whether to accept or reject conventionality. 
At the end of the novel two of them, Bernard and Olivier, seem to be 
intentionally postponing a decision in order to give society another 
chance, while the third, Armand, has chosen a role that will keep him 
within the security of convention. 
One might also include Jerome among those with the possibility of 
success, but the extremes of Alissa are so far from his nature that 
he is actually unaware of any need to rebel against convention. Thus, 
it is her beauty that he remembers at the end of the recit, not her 
piety. Her revolt will probably serve only to scare him away from 
any quest of his own. 
Of all the characters who fall into this category, only Lafcadio 
shows any real possibility of finding a meaningful existence. He has 
no need to rebel against convention because he never was actually a 
part of conventional society. He is not bound, either positively or 
negavively, to any externally imposed moral code. He is able to enjoy 
possessions, such as Carola Venitequa, without fear of being possessed 
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by them,  and when they no longer give him pleasure he can abandon them 
without being careless or inhuman.    His only moral restrictions are 
that he be indebted to no one and that he take no pleasure in necessity. 
All that he asks of life is that it be interesting,  and he scorns those 
who do not realize that it can be so:     "Tout ce betail s'acquitte comme 
d'une corvee monotone  de ce divertissement qu'est la vie,  a la bien 
prendre..."        Anything unnecessary is potentially entertaining, 
whether convention labels it as good or evil, and Lafcadio is equally 
prepared to save two unknown children from a fire or to push an 
unknown Amedee from a train.     In short,  he seems the perfect pupil of 
Menalque,  freed from convention without feeling constrained to refuse 
it,  ready to take his pleasure from any quarter.    His life may lack an 
external purpose, but in time perhaps he will find one. 
Lafcadio seeks amusement in actions without motivation,  for 
which he alone will be responsible, but Qide's irony makes such actions 
impossible.  Lafcadio saves the children for no reason, but thereby 
meets his niece and future mistress.  Likewise, the victim of his 
■gratuitous" murder is not a passing stranger,  as Lafcadio supposed, 
but his own brother-in-law.    His carelessness in this act would have 
brought a rapid end to his life of freedom if he were not saved by two 
women,   Carola, who wrongfully accuses Protos of Lafcadio's crime,  and 
Genevieve de Baraglioul, who persuades Lafcadio to allow Protos,  now 
guilty of the murder of Carola,  to take the blame for the other crime 
as well. 
36 Les Caves du Vatican,  p.  223- 
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Lafcadio saves his life at the expense of his authenticity, for 
in refusing responsibility for his deed he renders meaningless his act 
of self-will. Other opportunities will be open to him; nothing binds 
him except the conservative influence of Genevieve. Whether or not 
he can escape that influence through an 8ct more suited to his own 
capacity is a matter of conjecture. 
Gide's irony is even stronger in two of his last works of fiction, 
Oedipe and Thesee.  It is so strong that a judgment of whether the 
character succeeds or fails is a matter left for the reader tc 
interpret. 
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VI 
The Ironic Success 
After Les Faux-monnayeurs,  Gide wrote but two works of fiction 
that were of major importance.    Although some fifteen years separate 
Cedipe from Thesee,  they are companion pieces,  just as are L'lmmora- 
liste and La  Porte etroite.    The lines of distinction between the 
earlier pair of recits  are clearly defined,  but those  between the 
later pair of works are so vague  that some  critics,   such as Germaine 
Bree,   see in Oedipe the epitome of failure  and in Thesee a paragon of 
success;  other critics, Justine O'Brien,  for example,   see just the 
opposite. 
The legendary figures,  Oedipus and Theseus,  are  actually quite 
similar.    Both came to power through suspicious circumstances  after 
battling supernatural  beasts,  and both enjoyed prosperous  reigns.    It 
is only towards the end that their stories  diverge:     Theseus died 
happily, while Oedipus,  a victim of fate,  wandered about blind and 
homeless, until Theseus permitted him to die and be buried in Athens. 
This is  the framework within which Gide had to operate,  and there can 
be no question that,  on the surface, Theseus is the winner and Oedipus, 
Lhe loser.     It is Gide's manipulation of the myths that makes  such a 
judgment questionable. 
Oedipe is,  like Lafcadio,   illegitimate,  and he  too is plagued by 
the irony of fate.    In fact,  he seems to be a Lafcadio grown older, 
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mo re aware and more forceful. His opening speech reflects the same 
attitude that Lafcadio expressed:  "Enfant perdu, trouve, sans etat 
civil, sans papiers, je suis surtout heureux de ne devoir rien qu'a 
moi-meme.  Le bonheur ne me fut pas donne; je l'ai conquis."^' The 
knowledge that he was illegitimate was enough to make Oedipe stop 
imitating his elders and seek his own meaning in life:  "Puis, 
soudain, le fil est rompu. Jailli de l'inconnu, plus de passe, plus 
de modele, rien sur quoi m'appuyer; tout a creer, patrie, ancetres... 
a inventer, a decouvrir. Personne a qui ressembler, que moi-meme." 
Oedipe kills a stranger while on his way to learn from the Delphic 
Oracle the secret of his ancestry. Thereafter he loses faith in the 
Oracle; gods can only give answers, while he feels himself to be an 
answer in search of a question. The Sphinx offers a question, which 
he answers, thereby winning the crown of Thebes.  He is thus a self- 
made man who has won power, wealth, and happiness through the force 
of his own will. The movement of this play is, as it was in Satll, 
the systematic destruction of that success. 
For Oedipe, as for Lafcadio, a man's value lies in his being 
responsible for his actions; during the course of the play Oedipe 
learns that he is responsible for nothing. Every act to prove him- 
self, gratuitous or planned, is simply the fulfilling of his destiny: 
37oedipe, p. 253. 
38oedipe, p. 272. 
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Oedipe:    Et d'abord j'etsis done fils de roi sans 
le savoii 
meurtre 
Joc8ste: Les dieux en ont autrement decide.- 
ouuiu  owo a *•■!■ ——■ —» *-- ■ UP 
iv r. Je n'avsis pas besoin d'un 
,r  pour regner, mais qu^a attendre. 
Honv    o     n t.   oiil.roinppt,   Hf»o*i HP . -'' 
Free will has no meaning in a universe where every result is 
predestined, and man has no recourse but to submit to his fate.  But 
submit is just what Oedipe refuses to do. Tiresias demands that he 
repent, and he asks what meaning that would have? if his crime was 
fore-ordained, his repentance would be so as well. 
It is, of course, possible that his refusing to repent was also 
predestined. However, whether free or not, Oedipe has always acted 
as if he were free. He will continue to act that way, and by blinding 
himself he will no longer have to see a world in which he is not free: 
Tire'sias:  C'est done l'orgueil encore qui te fait 
crever les yeux. Dieu n'attendait point 
de toi ce nouveau forfeit, en paiement 
de tes premiers crimes, mais simplement 
ton repentir. 
Oedipe:   A present que me voici plus calme et que 
s'apaise ma douleur avec mon irritation 
contre moi, je puis discuter avec toi, 
Tiresias. J'admire que cette proposi- 
tion de repentence vienne de toi, qui ^ 
precisement crois que les dieux nous menent 
et qu'il n'etait pas en mon pouvoir d'echapper 
a ma destined. Sans doute cette offrande 
de moi etait-elle prevue, elle aussi, de 
sorte que je ne pusse pas m'y soustraire. 
N'importe!  C'est volontiers que je m'im- 
mole. J'etais parvenu a* ce point que je 
ne pouvais plus depasser qu'en prenant 
elan contre moi-meme.u 
Neither submitting nor despairing, he meets irony with irony. Fully 
39 Oedipe, p. 296. 
Uo, Oedipe, p. 301. 
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aware  that  even his self-punishment may be an act of the gods,  he 
welcomes his  suffering as  the only means of exploiting his potential 
to the fullest.    Pride it is indeed,  for he refuses  to repudiate him- 
self,  and,   an absurd hero,  he  embraces the absurdity and dares it to 
do its worst. 
Thesee,  like Oedipe,   is  a self-made man.    He has vanquished the 
Minotaur by himself,  and,  by neglecting to change his sails,  he 
hastens his ascent to the throne.    Cnce established,  he devotes him- 
self to being a good ruler,  and builds the most powerful city-state 
in Greece. 
He seems to be the perfect figure of success.    He has chosen his 
way of life  and has gained his goal  through  the force of his will 
alone.    His  devotion to  the public welfare prevents his lapsing into 
solipsism,   but it does not force him into false situations that will 
conflict with his pleasure.     Nothing in the narrative,  neither event 
nor speech,  denies his success. 
It is only in his last speech that one  begins to suspect that 
things are not quite as    The'see sees them.     Even here there is 
nothing explicit,  nothing concrete that one  can cite as proof;    merely 
a certain smugness in his tone that suggests  that perhaps,  just 
perhaps, Thesee has been deluding himself. 
J'ai fait ma ville. Apres moi, saura l'habiter 
inmortellement ma pensee. C'est consentant que 
j'approche la mort solitaire.    J'ai goute des v 
biens de la  terre.     II m'est doux de penser qu'apres 
moi,  que par moi, les horames se reconnaitront plus 
heureux,  meilleurs et plus libres.    Pcur le bien de 
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l'humanite future,   j'ai fait mon oeuvre.    J'ai  vecu.^1 
Thesle's smugness becomes more obvious when compared to the last 
words of Faust.    Faust too has  devoted himself to the common good} 
he has reclaimed fertile land  from the sea,   and,  as he grows old,  he 
envisions  the happy population that will  enjoy the fruits of his 
labor: 
Solch ein Gewimmel mocht ich 3ehnJ 
Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volke stehn! 
Zum Augenblicke dflrft ich sagen: 
"Verweile doch, du bist so schflni"'*2 
Faust's speech is full of subjunctives; he says, "I would have lived," 
while Thesee settles for the indicative and, "I have lived." Thesee 
is satisfied; he no longer wishes to "passer outre." 
This complacency makes one reconsider Thesee1 s earlier accom- 
plishments. His physical strength is due to his youthful habit of 
lifting rocks. But physical culture was not the purpose of this 
exercise; he lifted rocks to look for the armor that was said to be 
under one of them.  This strength is not due to his own will, but to 
his father's ruse. 
Prior to his battle with the Minotaur, Thesee learns from Dedale 
that the real secret of the Labyrinth is not the maze itself, but the 
intoxicating gases that destroy one's desire to escape. This fact 
seems to be forgotten until, just before entering the Labyrinth, 
Thesee casually comments that De"dele has given him a gas mask to 
^Andre Gide, Thesee (New York, 19U6), p. 123. 
U2 Faust, p. 331. 
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protect him from those vapors.  It is the gas mask, not his own 
strength, that enables The'see to meet the Minotaur on equal terms and 
to return safely from the Labyrinth. 
In Athens he settles down to governing and is a faithful husband 
to Phedre. She, however, is not exactly a faithful wife; this adds 
yet another question mark to his success. 
The final doubt comes in regard to the future success of the 
city he has founded.  Is the grandeur of Athens really due to his 
efforts, or is it rather the result of something else? After meeting 
Oedipe he says:  "De toutes parts, il avait echoue dans ses entre- 
prises. J'ai reussi. Meme cette supreme benediction que doit appor- 
ter sa depouille a la contree ou elle repose ce n'est pas sur sa 
Thebes ingrste qu'elle agira, mais sur Athenes."1*-' 
As the evidence mounts it becomes more and more apparent that 
Thesee is not at all the success he believes himself to be. He is 
rather like the Tityre of Le Promethee mal enchaine, who acts only 
in response to external stimuli, playing a role that he did not 
choose himself but which was forced on him by others. His "success" 
is not due to his will, it is due to his never being disillusioned. 
It is but a small step from Thesee, whose success is based on 
self-deception, to those who never recognize the lack of authenticity 
in accepting traditional values. These form the last group of 
Gide's characters to be examined in this study. 
U% hesee, p. 117. 
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The Blissfully Ignorant 
In order for the Gide hero to revolt against convention, there 
must be a large population of those who uphold conventional values. 
These people never see anything wrong with conventional values, never 
try to break with tradition, end do not seem any the worse for their 
ignorance.  Among these are Jerome, whom we have already examined, 
Marceline, Ariane, Creon, all the women of Les Caves du Vatican, most. 
of the older generation of Les Faux-monnayeurs, and the group that 
surrounds the narrator of Paludes. They are the ones to whom Gide's 
novelist-heroes direct their efforts, and who turn deaf ears to those 
efforts. Why should they listen when they are happy as they are? 
The narrator of Paludes tries to explain this situation, a propos 
of Angele, to his friend Hubert: 
—Mais elle n'est pas heureuse, mon cher ami; elle 
croit l'etre parce qu'elle ne se rend pas compte de 
son etet; tu penses bien que si la mediocrite se 
joint a la cecite", c'est encore plus triste. 
 Et quand tu ouvrirais ses yeuxj quand tu aurais 
tant fait que de la rendre malheureuse? 
—Ce serait deja bien plus interessant; au moins 
elle ne serait plus setisfaite;--elle chercherait. 
Most of his efforts, aside from writing Paludes, are directed 
toward making her recognize her unheppiness, which she refuses to do. 
Wipaludes, pp. 388-9. 
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He does not accept the advice of his friend,  Barnebe the moralist, 
who reminds him that even if he succeeds he will have accomplished 
nothing for her,  he will  only have  increased his own responsibility. 
Nor will he  agree with Oedipe,  that happiness  based on ignorance is 
sufficient for the masses.    He cannot admit that many,  himself 
included,  are  not strong  enough to  rebel  against convention;   revolt 
would only destroy them. 
Among the inhabitants of Gide's  "juste milieu" one character, 
Amedee Fleurissoire,  stands out as  being particularly troublesome. 
He is,  of all  of Gide's  characters,  one of the least aware,  and was 
no doubt intended to be  the most ridiculous of the sots of Gide's 
last sotie;   he certainly suffers the greatest physical  torment at 
the hand of his creator.     Yet his  ignorance,  or innocence,  se*ms  so 
undeserving  of this treatment that he begins to take on a  sort of 
nobility beneath his ridiculous exterior. 
Amedee  is Gide's "Don Quixote",  but while Cervantes'  knight was 
demented, Gide's crusader is simply dull.    Although never awakened 
from his ignorance, he is stirred to leave his monotonous,   sedentary 
existence to  go out and prove himself.     Confronted with the kidnapping 
of the Pope,   he does not,  like a pious hypocrite,  dig into his pocket 
to help finance the crusade.    Instead,  he abandons home, wife,  and 
position to devote himself to the  salvation of the symbol of right 
and order:     "Qu'a moi soit reserve cela!    plein d'une admiration et 
d'une reconnaissance attendrie:     il avait done enfin trouve sa 
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raison d'etre."^ 
No doubt he does not understand the significance of the false 
Pope, but that does not matter. The important thing is that some- 
thing must be done, and he is going to do it, whatever it may be. 
On his way he becomes the victim of all kinds of torment. After 
surviving ordeals of fleas, bedbugs, and mosquitoes, he loses his 
virginity to the mistress of his enemy, and fears he has contracted 
syphilis as a puni shment for straying from his holy mission. The 
unwitting dupe of the "kidnappers," he believes he is carrying out 
an important mission when he is thrown from the train, the victim of 
a gratuitous crime, and dies without ever learning his mistake. 
On the surface the situation seems quite ridiculous, the extreme 
of unthinking, counterfeit existence. But if nobility can be found in 
the soul of Don Quixote while he battles barbers and windmills, can 
it not also be found in Amedee? Is not the difference between him 
and Thesee merely a matter of degree? If Oedipe can find meaning to 
life in acting as if he were free, Amedee can do the same in acting 
as if he had a mission. Within the limits of his intelligence he is 
as successful as Menalque is within his limits. The key to his 
success lies in his not living long enough to be disillusioned. 
Gide was not preaching the value of "ignorance is bliss." Such 
a lesson would in fact be impossible, for in order to learn it one 
must already understand that other possibilities exist, and by then 
a return to ignorance is impossible. What Gide does demonstrate in 
^Les Caves du Vatican, p. 122. 
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Ame'dee is that each of us has his own capacity for life, and  that 
authentic existence depends on our performing to  the limits  of that 
capacity.    To underperform is to lead a counterfeit, meaningless 
existence;  to misjudge one's capacity is to court disaster. 
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VIII 
Conclusion 
Quel que soit le livre que j'ecris,  je ne m'y 
donne jamais tout entier,  et le sujet qui me 
reclame le plus  inst8mment,   sitot apres, se developpe 
cependant h 1'autre extremite de moi-meme. 
On ne tracera pas aisement la  trajectoire 
de mon esprit;     sa courbe ne se revel era que dans 
mon style et echappera a plus d'un.    Si quelqu'un, 
dans mon dernier ecrit,  pense saisir enfin ma 
ressemblance,  qu'il se detrompe:     c'est toujours 
de mon dernier-ne que je suis le plus  different. W> 
Gide made this entry in his journal in 1909, when critics were 
wondering how L'Immoraliste and La Porte £troite could have come from 
the same author.    Here he makes it clear that he did not intend,  in 
any of his works,  to propose a way of life that should be followed. 
Instead,  his works are examinations of various  approaches  to life. 
He asked that each man examine his own life and find for himself the 
path best suited to his own needs and capabilities,  rather than 
merely accept what was offered to him. 
At the beginning of this study we postulated certain basic 
ingredients indispensable for a  successful way of life.    Three 
foreign writers who greatly influenced Gide  all demonstrated the need 
to escape from conventional patterns in order to examine one's 
life.    We have seen this need expressed by many of Gide's heroes, 
even those who were unable  to make  that break themselves.    Those who 
^6Andre Gide,  Journal,  lle Cahier,  in Oeuvres Completes,  v. VI, 
p.  U02. 
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do escape conventionality and fail, do so because of failures to 
fully understand their own natures and the demands of life. 
We found in Goethe the need for progression in one's life, and 
found this reflected in the fear of possession on the part of many of 
Gide's heroes. The lack of progression is essential to the failure 
of two of Gide's major unsuccessful characters. Michel defines his 
life by defying conventional morality, so that change is not advance- 
ment, but mere substitution of equal pleasures. Likewise, Alissa's 
life is based on sacrifice, and when she no longer has anything to 
sacrifice it becomes static. 
The source of this progress is found in Dostoievsky; it is the 
recognition of both the celestial and the terrestrial sides of human 
nature. By accepting these opposing tendencies, hedonism and 
altruism, one is able to advance instead of simply making a static 
substitution of pleasures, or of sacrifices. Menalque and Promethee 
succeed in balancing these opposing tendencies, and Oedipe and Thesee 
do so also; such an equilibrium is lacking in Alissa and Michel. 
This recognition of both sides of life also provides the 
restraint and discipline that Nietzsche demanded. As Gide himself 
commented, his "ironic" works examine approaches to life that take 
one attitude to excess. Such characters lack the restraint that is 
necessary for meaningful existence. 
Not all of Gide's heroes are capable of breaking with tradition. 
The narrator of Paludes, Julius de Baraglioul, Edouard and SaUl are 
aware of the need to make that break, but lack the strength necessary 
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for it. Still others never know that the need exists. The latter 
include the audience for which Gide intended his work. Like his 
novelist-characters, he wanted to awaken men to the fact of counter- 
feit existence.  He did not claim to be able to lead them out of that 
counterfeit; he merely wanted to show them that escape was possible, 
and to demonstrate some of the pitfalls along the way out.  Beyond 
that it is up lo  the individual to choose for himself the goals and 
values of his own life. 
. 
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